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1. Introduction: hiring subsidies as an active policy to stimulating job demand 
Hiring subsidies have a long tradition as important elements in Danish labour market policy. Thus in 
1979, as a response to rising long-term unemployment following the first oil-crisis, a large-scale 
subsidy-scheme (the so called job-offer-scheme) was created. This provided wage subsidies to public 
or private employers to employ people who were both long-term unemployed and at risk of losing their 
benefits for a period of 7 to 9 months. Under the rules at the time, these people were then able to 
claim unemployment benefits for another period.  
As part of a major labour market reform in 1993, it was stipulated that people employed using a hiring 
subsidy would no longer qualify to regain the right to claim benefits. Aside from that, hiring subsidies 
for the employment of long-term unemployed by public and private employers still exist today as 
important programmes of active labour market policy. Their main aim is to allow the unemployed to get 
on-the-job-training and overcome the hiring barriers usually faced by individuals who have been out of 
work for a longer period. If employed by a private employer, a normal wage consistent with collective 
agreements is paid. In public employment a special wage rate is paid.  
Over the years, traditional standard hiring subsidies have been supplemented by a number of other 
employment subsidies subject to various conditions.  
Under one such scheme, unemployed people may be employed as unpaid trainees for a short period 
of time. During the internship, they can claim their normal benefits and are not paid by the employer, 
who receives what is equivalent to a full hiring subsidy for this time. 
The so-called flexi-job scheme is targeted at individuals with permanent employability problems and 
who are at risk of needing to claim the disability pension. As an alternative, a permanent hiring subsidy 
is paid to employers for such people, which compensates for the reduced productivity. A related 
scheme exists for recipients of the disability pension, who qualify for a hiring subsidy for part-time 
employment. In both schemes the person gets a normal wages for the actual hours worked and the 
relevant benefit for the rest of the time.  
Two other hiring subsidies are linked to programmes with an element of formal education.  
The subsidy for adult apprenticeships is paid to employers who hire adults, while they study to 
become skilled workers. The worker receives a wage consistent with collective agreements.  
In addition there is a hiring subsidy provided under the job-rotation scheme. This subsidy is paid to 
employers who send their employees to further training or education, while hiring an unemployed 
substitute for the same number of hours. Both the substitute and the employee receive a normal wage 
during this period. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the number of full-time participants in each of the various schemes. 
These are explained and assessed in more detail in Section 2 below. The number of participants in 
counselling and training are included for comparison.  
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Table 1: Labour market activation measures - number of full-time participants in 2013  
  2013 
Number of full-time participants Insured 
Non-
insured Total 
Total in activation (excluding flexi-jobs and adult 
apprenticeships) 23 606 35 085 58 691 
Counselling and training  7 495 20 784 28 279 
Employed with a standard hiring subsidy 8 552 4 928 13 480 
     With private employer 2 673 2 306 4 979 
     With public employer 5 879 2 622 8 501 
Internships (unpaid) 4 013 9 336 13 349 
     With private employer 2 674 6 511 9 185 
     With public employer 1 340 2 824 4 164 
Flexi-jobs n.a. n.a. 54 216 
Job rotation (number of substitutes) 3 462 . 3 462 
     With private employer 1 453 . 1 453 
     With public employer 2 008 . 2 008 
Adult apprenticeships from unemployment (estimated) n.a. n.a. 2 500 
Note: The participants are divided into two categories – insured (members of an unemployment 
insurance fund) and non-insured (receiving social assistance as unemployed).  
Source: Databanks of the National Labour Market Authority (www.jobindsats.dk) and of Statistics 
Denmark (www.statistikbank.dk) 
2. Hiring subsidies today: detailed description 
2.1 Employment with a standard hiring subsidy for unemployed  
As seen from Table 1, in 2013 a total of 13 480 full-time persons were employed using a standard 
hiring subsidy, of which the majority (63 %) were insured unemployed. Also most of employment 
provided was in the public sector. A hiring subsidy for employment in the public sector can be paid 
from the first day of unemployment, whereas hiring subsidies for employment in the private sector are 
only payable if the individual has been unemployed for 6 months. The maximum duration of the hiring 
subsidy is six months for a public sector employer and one year for a private employer. In both cases, 
those employees employed with a hiring subsidy must not replace any existing employees.  
The wage paid to the employed person is set by collective agreements. However for a person 
employed with a hiring subsidy in the public sector, the total wage may not exceed the amount of the 
unemployment benefit that would normally be payable. In order to make sure that this amount is not 
exceeded, the number of actual hours worked is reduced so that the hourly rate paid is the same as 
the hourly rate set out by the collective agreement.  
Employers in the private sector receive a hiring subsidy of EUR 10 (73 DKK) per hour (equal to around 
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one-third of the average wage for unskilled workers). For public sector employers, the hiring subsidy is 
EUR 19 (141 DKK) an hour. The higher hiring subsidy in the public sector must be considered in light 
of the fact that public employers are required to hire a certain number of employees using a hiring 
subsidy, while the employment of unemployed people with a hiring subsidy is voluntary for the private 
employers.  
Over the years, there have been several evaluations performed on the success of hiring subsidies in 
the public and the private sectors in improving the prospects of employment for the unemployed. The 
main conclusion from these evaluations is that the overall effects of hiring subsidies largely depend on 
whether they are applied to private or public jobs. While there is strong evidence that hiring subsidies 
for private employers lead to positive employment outcomes for participants, there is also some 
evidence that employment with a hiring subsidy in the public sector can lead to an increase in the 
subsequent duration of unemployment. In the literature, there is also evidence that private hiring 
subsidies lead to a more rapid return to stable ordinary employment, while also increasing the 
likelihood of a higher salary (Rosholm and Svarer, 2011). The positive outcomes resulting from private 
hiring subsidies are supported by two recent evaluations (KORA, 2013a; Damvad, 2013).  
A study by Christensen and Jacobsen found that that both private and public sector hiring subsidies 
are associated with locking-in effects. For private subsidised employment these effects are 
outweighed by the subsequent effects of improved qualifications, but this is not the case for subsidised 
employment in the public sector (Christensen and Jacobsen, 2009). In a cost-benefit analysis, where 
the participants were tracked over a 10-year period using administrative registers, it has also been 
shown that hiring subsidies in the private sector leads to a significant overall economic surplus for 
society as a whole. Moreover, public employment with a hiring subsidy also yields a significant 
surplus, but less than private hiring subsidies (Jespersen et al, 2008). In both cases, this is because 
participants, on average, have higher incomes and receive, on average, less income transfers 
following the completion of the program.  
In addition to the direct employment effects of hiring subsidies there are also secondary effects for 
instance in the form of crowding out of ordinary employment. However, available evidence does not 
indicate that private and public hiring subsidies lead to a displacement of regular jobs (KORA, 2013b, 
Pons et al, 2010). 
The reasons for the differences between the results from hiring subsidies in the private and the public 
sector are not fully clear. One reason could be that private employers have greater flexibility in 
recruiting qualified participants into ordinary jobs in the same company. Also because a large share of 
the participants employed in the public sector are there because of the required quota, may explain 
that why they are not recruited to ordinary jobs, but only fulfil marginal functions at the workplace, 
before they are replaced by a new unemployed person. Based on this argument, a Government expert 
committee charged with the task of reforming active labour market policy has proposed to fully 
harmonize the rules for public and private hiring subsidies and therefore to also abolish the quota 
system (Ekspertgruppen, 2014:194) 
2.2 Unpaid internships 
The purpose of this programme is that a short internship will lead to a job or better qualifications for 
the unemployed. It may also motivate the trainee towards further education for a specific trade or 
occupation. An internship can last up to 4 weeks for unemployed members of an unemployment 
insurance fund and up to 13 weeks for social assistance recipients with a lack of work experience or a 
prior (long) period of unemployment. The employer does not pay wages during the training period. 
=Instead, the participants receive a benefit from their unemployment fund or the municipality, which is 
equal to the benefit that they would otherwise be entitled to. The intern will work normal working hours.  
As shown in Table1, the number of participants in internships is broadly similar to those employed 
using a hiring subsidy, when measured in terms of full-time employees. Due to the short duration of 
the internships the actual number of participants is of course higher. Also more private sector than 
public sector employers offer internships. The reasons for this are that that no quota system exists for 
internships in the public sector and, on the other hand, that there are no wage costs for the employer, 
when hiring an intern. 
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The effects of unpaid internships are generally less evaluated than the effects of hiring subsidies. 
However, there are some indications that internships can lead to positive employment outcomes. 
These positive effects can be partly attributed to the facts that the internships are of relatively short 
duration. Therefore the retention effects are small and insignificant, and the overall effects for most 
unemployed people are positive (Rosholm and Svarer, 2011). 
2.3 Flexi-jobs 
This scheme was introduced in 1998 and targeted at persons with a permanently reduced working 
capacity. It has the aim of retaining such people in the labour market by paying a hiring subsidy to 
their employer. Since then a large number of participants have entered the scheme. As seen from 
Table 1, the number of participants in 2013 amounted to 54 000 persons. When the scheme was 
introduced, it was expected that the number of people claiming disability pension would be reduced as 
the weakest citizens now had the opportunity to stay on the labour market through the flexi-jobs 
scheme. However, this did not happen. As a result, the scheme came under increasing criticism 
(Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2010).  
As part of a large reform of both the disability pension and the flexi-job scheme in 2012, the flexi-job 
scheme was changed in a number of ways: 
i. persons aged less than 40 years old only receive a flexi-job for five years. If the person is 
older than 40 years, the first flexi-job will be for five years, and can then become permanent.  
ii. the wage paid by the employer will only be based on actual working hours and adjusted for the 
productivity of the person employed in the flexi-job and not, as before, based on the maximum 
normal working time. The company will therefore not pay the full salary according to the 
normal wage schedule, but only a salary reflecting the employee's productivity. The company 
will therefore no longer receive a direct hiring subsidy. The subsidy is instead paid to the 
employee on top of the adjusted salary. 
iii. for hours not worked, the person in the flexi-job will in addition receive a benefit from the 
municipality. The benefit will be based on 98 % of the maximum unemployment benefit equal 
to about EUR 2 300 (DKK 17 300) per month in 2014. Also, the benefit will be reduced with 
increases in the wage. At wage levels paid by the employer exceeding EUR 5 400 (DKK 40 
200) per month, the subsidy will be fully phased out. The new scheme will therefore imply that 
the highest benefits are paid to persons with the lowest incomes. Persons waiting to get a 
flexi-job will receive a special benefit equivalent to 89 % of unemployment benefits which they 
might receive. 
iv. unemployed persons referred to a flexi-job are subject to a more active regime with respect to 
contacting the job-centre and engaging in an active job-search.  
v. the new rules will only apply to people, who enter the scheme after 1 January 2013, and to 
people, who move to another flexi-job after that date.  
These elements of the reform must be welcomed from the viewpoint that the scheme provided a very 
generous subsidy, which in principle topped up the wage paid by the employer to provide a normal 
full-time income. This resulted in paying the largest subsidy to the earners of the highest incomes. On 
the other hand, there is a risk that flexi-jobs will become less flexible as the employee’s capacity to 
work changes as the employer now pays for a specific number of actual working hours and therefore 
may be less willing to allow the employee to reduce the time they work as a result of temporary set-
backs in his or her health.  
The reform came into effect from 1 January 1 2013 and was estimated to create additional public 
revenues of EUR (DKK 1 900 000 000) in 2020. Unsurprisingly, criticism has come from NGOs 
defending the rights of disabled persons, who have claimed that the reform places the burden of some 
austerity measures on a vulnerable part of the population. The reform has not yet had any discernible 
effect on the number of participants, which actually increased slightly in 2013 compared to previous 
years. No evaluations of the reform have yet been published.  
2.4 Job-rotation 
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While the hiring subsidies discussed until now have been solely targeted at employment of a specific 
target group, the job-rotation scheme is more complex and involves the training of employed persons 
combined with the temporary employment of a substitute. In the early 1990s, job-rotation schemes 
were introduced as an important tool of Danish labour market policy and at their high point, covered 
around 80 000 full-time participants equivalent to 2.7 %of the workforce (Compston & Madsen, 2001). 
As unemployment levels fell during the 1990s the schemes were gradually rolled back. What remains 
today is a minor programme with around 3 500 full-time participants. The present scheme has the 
following characteristics: 
i. for every hour an employee is on training and an unemployed person is employed a as a 
substitute, employers in the private sector receive a hiring subsidy of  EUR 26 (DKK 195)  per 
hour for, while public sector employers receive EUR 23 (DKK 173) per hour.  
ii. the substitute must have been unemployed for at least 3 months. The data show that about 
two thirds of the substitutes had been unemployed for less than 6 months. The average 
duration of a job rotation cycle is between 15 and 20 weeks.  
iii. during employment, the substitute employee receives a normal wage, but will not qualify to 
regain the right to benefits, because the employment is subsidised.  
iv. it is a condition that the substitute is employed for at least 10 hours a week for a maximum of 
one year.  
v. there is both a regular job rotation scheme in place for skilled and unskilled workers as well as 
a special job rotation scheme for people with low or medium levels of higher education.  
There have been no nationwide evaluations of the present version of job-rotation. However, one may 
assume that the effect can probably be compared with the effects of other hiring subsidies, where 
existing evidence suggests positive effects for schemes in the private sector and negative effects for 
schemes in the public sector. This does not take account of the effect of the further education that the 
present employees receive.  
An analysis of the effects of job-rotation in Employment Region of Northern Jutland indicated more 
than three quarters of the substitutes were in ordinary employment immediately after finishing their 
job-rotation cycle (COWI, 2012). This is a higher level than that normally observed when evaluating a 
hiring subsidy. However, the evaluation does not take account of possible differences in the 
characteristics of the participants.  
2.5 Adult apprenticeships 
The adult apprenticeship scheme is a hiring subsidy for companies that employ an adult over 25 years 
of age in order to provide them with suitable vocational education. The aim of the measure is that the 
unskilled workers, who did not get sufficient education when they were young, can receive a 
vocational education. The employer pays the salary of the apprentice and receives a subsidy for the 
first 2 years of the apprenticeship period, which is normally four years. The hiring subsidy amounts to 
EUR 4 (DKK 30) per hour. A condition of receiving the subsidy is that the training contract must have 
been concluded with a person over 25 years of age and who does not have a vocational education or 
has vocational education that has not been used during the last 5 years, or else has been on 
unemployment benefits or social assistance for more than 9 months (for people over 30) or 6 months 
in the case of those under 30. It is also a condition that the apprentice during the period that the 
subsidy is paid receives a salary at least equal to the lowest wage that an unskilled worker in the 
relevant sector is entitled. 
The total number of adult apprenticeships is estimated at around 8 000 in 2011, of which around one-
third were previously unemployed. The age distribution is fairly stable over time. Approximately 40 % 
of apprentices are between 25 and 29 years of age, and about 60 % are 30 years or older. 
Approximately 60 % are unskilled, while about 40 % are skilled or have a higher education prior to 
entering the program (Ekspertgruppen, 2014:48). 
A recent evaluation of the scheme shows that insured unemployed and social assistance recipients 
who are trained as adult apprentices, have a significantly better chance of finding a job in the first year 
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after graduation compared to unemployed people who have been in normal adult training courses 
(Deliotte, 2013). After one year, 70 % of participants are in employment, compared to 58 % in the 
comparable control group. Positive employment outcomes are particularly significant for former 
recipients of social assistance. They also apply in the case of unemployed people who already have a 
vocational education or who are unskilled. The effects are similar across age groups. However, there 
is a tendency towards more positive employment outcomes for older unemployed people.  For the 
participants who were previously employed the effects are less clear. Finally, there are no indications 
that the scheme leads to a significant ‘crowding-out’ of normal apprenticeships.  
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Adult apprenticeship 
Summary  
The adult apprenticeship scheme is a hiring subsidy for companies that employ an adult over 
25 years of age in order to provide them with suitable vocational education. The aim of the 
measure is that the unskilled workers, who did not get sufficient education when they were 
young, can receive a vocational education. The measure has proven to be successful in 
raising the employment chances of both insured and non-insured unemployed people.  
Type of measure 
The adult apprenticeship scheme is a combination of a hiring subsidy and vocational 
education. The employer pays the salary of the apprentice and receives a subsidy for the 
first 2 years of the apprenticeship period, which is normally four years. The hiring subsidy 
amounts to EUR 4 (DKK 30) per hour.  
Financing source(s) of the  
The hiring subsidy is financed from the Government budget. 
Duration of the measure 
The measure is permanent.- 
Description   
A condition of receiving the subsidy is that the training contract must have been concluded 
with a person over 25 years of age and who does not have a vocational education or has 
vocational education that has not been used during the last 5 years, or else has been on 
unemployment benefits or social assistance for more than 9 months (for people over 30) or 6 
months in the case of those under 30. It is also a condition that the apprentice during the 
period that the subsidy is paid receives a salary at least equal to the lowest wage that an 
unskilled worker in the relevant sector is entitled. 
Policies that complement the measure  
The measure complements the vocational education system.  
Evaluation results  
A recent evaluation of the scheme shows that insured unemployed and social assistance 
recipients who are trained as adult apprentices, have a significantly better chance of finding 
a job in the first year after graduation compared to unemployed people who have been in 
normal adult training courses (Deliotte, 2013). After one year, 70 % of participants are in 
employment, compared to 58 % in the comparable control group. Positive employment 
outcomes are particularly significant for former recipients of social assistance. They also 
apply in the case of unemployed people who already have a vocational education or who are 
unskilled. The effects are similar across age groups. However, there is a tendency towards 
more positive employment outcomes for older unemployed people.  For the participants who 
were previously employed the effects are less clear. Finally, there are no indications that the 
scheme leads to a significant ‘crowding-out’ of normal apprenticeships 
Lessons from the initiative  
The measure has proven to be successful in letting unemployed adults who are also 
unskilled or skilled (though with obsolete qualifications) upgrade their qualifications, while 
benefitting from the work experience that they have already acquired. The measure is an 
example of good practice for life-long learning which allows the workforce to adapt to the 
changing composition of demand, where is generally an increasing demand for skilled 
workers. The main bottleneck is that a training contract has to be concluded with an 
employer in order to implement the measure. There were also fears that the measure would 
crowd out other apprentices, but this does not seem to have been the case.  
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3. Conclusion 
Hiring subsidies have a long tradition as important policy measures in Danish labour market policy. In 
1979, as a response to rising long-term unemployment following the first oil-crisis, a large-scale 
subsidy-scheme was created, which gave unemployed people who were at risk of exhausting their 
benefits the right to be employed using a wage-subsidy with either a public or private sector employer. 
Such hiring subsidies for the employment of unemployed people by public and private sector 
employers still exist today as important programmes of active labour market policy.  
Some hiring subsidies are solely aimed at getting the unemployed into employment, while others have 
the objective of upgrading of formal skills (job-rotation and subsidies to adult apprenticeships) or the 
employment of persons with reduced work capacity (flexi-jobs).  For most hiring subsidies, the 
instrument applied is the payment of a wage subsidy to the employers, while other programmes like 
the flexi-jobs feature a wage subsidy with a more complicated structure.  
Most of the schemes have undergone a number of evaluations. This is especially so in the case of 
standard hiring subsidies paid to private and public sector employers. Here the main finding is that the 
effects of the hiring subsidies largely depend on whether the employer is drawn from the public or 
private sector. While there is strong evidence that hiring subsidies for private employers lead to 
positive employment outcomes for participants, there is also some evidence that employment with a 
hiring subsidy in the public sector can actually increase the duration of subsequent unemployment. In 
the literature, there is also evidence that private sector hiring subsidies lead to a more rapid return to 
stable ordinary employment, while also ensuring a higher salary.  In addition to the direct employment 
effects of hiring subsidies there may also be secondary effects for instance in the form of crowding out 
of ordinary employment. However, available evidence does not indicate that hiring subsidies used in 
the private and public sector lead to a displacement of regular jobs.  
The reasons for the differences in the outcomes delivered by hiring subsidies in the private and the 
public sectors are not immediately evident. One reason could be that private employers have greater 
flexibility in recruiting qualified participants into ordinary jobs in the same company. Also the fact that a 
significant number of the participants employed using hiring subsidies in the public sector are only 
there due to a quota system may explain that they are not kept on after the end of the subsidy. They 
only fill marginal functions at the workplace, before they are replaced by a new previously unemployed 
hire. Proposals have therefore been made to harmonise the rules for private and public sector hiring 
subsidies. 
For the flexi-job scheme and job-rotation there are no recent national evaluations available. On intake 
alone, the flexi-job scheme seems to have been successful in keeping a significant number of disabled 
people in work, but the cost to the public budgets are quite high and problems with deadweight loss 
are possible. However, no recent evidence is available on this. Job-rotation has not been extensively 
evaluated in its present form. A regional evaluation gives positive indications, but suffers from some 
methodological problems.  
In relation to the adult apprenticeships scheme, a recent evaluation shows that insured unemployed 
and social assistance recipients, who are trained as adult apprentices, have a significantly better 
chance of finding a job in the first year after completion compared to unemployed people who have 
been in normal adult education courses. One year after completion, 70 % of the participants are in 
employment, compared to 58 % in a comparable control group. The effects are particularly large 
significant former recipients of social assistance. The positive effects apply to those unemployed 
people who already have a vocational education or are unskilled. 
Based on available evidence, the most successful Danish hiring subsidies programmes are those 
programmes which support employment of long-term unemployed with private sector employers and 
the adult apprenticeships scheme.  Both cases are examples of good practice. An important lesson to 
be learned is also that hiring subsidies for employment in the public sector should be focused at 
ensuring sufficient quality of the on-the-job training provided. Quota-based systems should be avoided 
as they require public sector employers to take on unemployed people without having any meaningful 
tasks to offer them. 
EEPO Review: Stimulating Job Demand: The Design of Effective Hiring Subsidies in Europe, March 2014 
10 
4. Bibliography 
Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen (2010): Analyse af fleksjobordningen [Analysis of the flexi-job scheme], 
København (www.ams.dk) 
Christensen, R. and Jacobsen (2008): Analyse af effekten af aktivering og voksen- og efteruddannelse 
for forsikrede ledige [Analysis of the effect of activation and of education and training for insured 
unemployed], Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR), Copenhagen Business School 
Compston, H., and Madsen, P.K. (2001): “Conceptual innovation and public policy: unemployment and 
paid leave schemes in Denmark”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 11(2), pp. 117-132 
COWI (2012): Analyse af jobrotation i Nordjylland [Analysis of job-rotation in Northern Jutland], 
Aalborg (www.brnordjylland.dk) 
Damvad (2013): Effekterne af uddannelse på lediges mulighed for at komme i beskæftigelse [Effects 
of education on the employments chances of unemployed], København 
Deloitte (2013): Evaluering af voksenlærlingeordningen – Effekter, anvendelse og 
incitamenter[Evaluation of the adult apprenticeship scheme – Effects, use and incentives], København 
(www.ams.dk) 
Det Nationale Institut for Kommuners og Regioners Analyse og Forskning (KORA) (2013a): Effekten 
af uddannelsesaktivering for forsikrede ledige [The  effects of education for insured unemployed], 
København (www.kora.dk) 
Det Nationale Institut for Kommuners og Regioners Analyse og Forskning (KORA) (2013b): Effekten 
af løntilskud på kommunale arbejdspladser [The effect of wage subsidies on employment in 
municipalities], København (www.kora.dk) 
Ekspertgruppen (2014): Veje til job – en arbejdsmarkedsindsats med mening [Pathways to job – a 
meaningful active labour market policy], Beskæftigelsesministeriet, February 2014 (www.bm.dk) 
Jespersen, S. et al (2008): “Costs and benefits of Danish active labour market programs”, Labour 
Economics, Volume 15, Issue 5, October 2008, Pages 859–884 
Pons, G. m.fl. (2010): The Effect of a Wage Subsidy on Employment in the Subsidised Firm, AKF 
Working Paper, København (www.kf.dk) 
Rosholm, M. og M. Svarer (2011): Effekter af virksomhedsrettet aktivering i den aktive 
arbejdsmarkedspolitik [The effects of firm-based activation as part of active labour market policy], 
National Labour Market Directorate, København (www.ams.dk)
EEPO Review: Stimulating Job Demand: The Design of Effective Hiring Subsidies in Europe, March 2014 
11 
Annex 2: Measure Description Tables 
Measure 
Title 
Type of 
measure: 
hiring 
subsidy, 
conversion 
of tempo-
rary con-
tracts, 
voucher 
scheme, 
etc. 
Target 
Group  
No. of 
benefi-
ciaries 
(2013) 
Amount 
of subsi-
dy and 
duration 
of subsi-
dy  
Permanent 
or Tempo-
rary 
measure 
and dates 
of imple-
mentation  
 
Conditionali-
ty imposed 
on firms 
Funding 
source 
and total 
budget  
(2012) 
Describe 
any 
measures 
comple-
menting 
the initia-
tive (e.g. 
training, 
job search 
assistance 
etc) 
Please indicate if 
other stakehold-
ers are involved 
either at the 
design stage, in 
the delivery of 
the measure or in 
its monitoring 
Monitoring 
arrange-
ments in 
place 
Assessment of the measure:  
Please give as much detail as possible on the as-
sessment of the measure. 
Please indicate whether the initiative causes either 
deadweight, replacement and/or substitution ef-
fects.  
Please be sure to indicate the source of information 
for the assessment (i.e. is it based on an existing 
evaluation or is it the experts’ own assessment?). 
Standard 
hiring 
subsidy 
Hiring 
subsidy 
Unem-
ployed 
13400 Private 
sector: 
DKK 
73per 
hour for a 
period of 
12 
months 
Public 
sector: 
DKK 
141per 
hour for a 
period of 
6months 
Permanent No crowding 
out of ordi-
nary em-
ployment 
Govern-
ment 
budget. 
Annual 
net cost  
DKK 635 
000 
000(adjus
ted for 
the 
alterna-
tive costs 
of bene-
fits) 
None The local shop-
steward monitors 
the crowding out 
of ordinary em-
ployees 
Number of 
participants 
monitored by 
the National 
Labour 
Market 
Authority 
The main conclusion from several evaluations is 
that the effects of the hiring subsidies largely 
depends on whether they are applied in the private 
or public sectors. There is strong evidence that 
hiring subsidies for private employers lead to 
positive employment outcomes for participants. 
However, there is also some evidence that em-
ployment with a hiring subsidy in the public sector 
actually increases the duration of subsequent 
unemployment. There is also evidence that hiring 
subsidies in the private sector leads to a more rapid 
return to stable ordinary employment, while also 
ensuring a higher salary (Rosholm and Svarer, 
2011). The positive outcomes from private sector 
hiring subsidies are backed up by two recent evalu-
ations (KORA, 2013a; Damvad, 2013). A study by 
Christensen and Jacobsen found that both the 
private and public sector hiring subsidies are asso-
ciated with locking-in effects. For subsidised 
employment in the private sector, these effects are 
outweighed by the subsequent effects of improved 
qualifications, but this is not the case for subsidised 
employment in the public sector (Christensen and 
Jacobsen, 2009). In a cost-benefit analysis, where 
the participants were tracked over a 10-year period 
using administrative registers, it was shown that 
hiring subsidies in the private sector led to a signif-
icant economic surplus for society as a whole. 
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Employment with a hiring subsidy in the public 
sector also yields a significant surplus, but less so 
than private sector hiring subsidies (Jespersen et al, 
2008). In both cases, this is due to the fact that 
participants have higher incomes and receive less 
income transfers after the completion of the pro-
gramme. In addition to the direct employment 
effects of hiring subsidies there may also be sec-
ondary effects, for instance, in the form of reduced 
ordinary employment. However, available evidence 
does not indicate that private and public sector 
hiring subsidies lead to a displacement of regular 
jobs (KORA, 2013b, Pons et al, 2010). 
Unpaid 
intern-
ships 
Hiring 
subsidy 
Unem-
ployed 
13 300 Equal to 
benefits. 
Duration 
: 4 weeks 
for 
insured 
and 13 
weeks for 
non-
insured 
Permanent No crowding 
out of ordi-
nary em-
ployment 
No extra 
cost for 
Govern-
ment 
budget. 
None The local shop-
steward monitors 
the crowding out 
of ordinary em-
ployees 
Number of 
participants 
monitored by 
the National 
Labour 
Market 
Authority 
The effects of unpaid internships are not as well 
evaluated as the effects of hiring subsidies. Howev-
er, there are indications that internships can lead to 
positive employment outcomes. These positive 
outcomes can be partly attributed to relatively short 
duration of such internships. Therefore, retention 
effects are small and insignificant, while the overall 
effects for the unemployed people on these pro-
grammes are positive (Rosholm and Svarer, 2011). 
 
Flexi-job Hiring 
subsidy 
People 
with 
disabil-
ities 
54200 Calculat-
ed on the 
basis of 
the 
produc-
tivity of 
the 
employee 
Permanent No crowding 
out of ordi-
nary em-
ployment 
Govern-
ment 
budget. 
(DKK  
720 000 
000) 
Persons 
waiting to a 
flexi-job 
will receive 
a benefit 
equal to 89 
% of un-
employ-
ment 
benefits 
 Number of 
participants 
monitored by 
the National 
Labour 
Market 
Authority 
No evaluations of the most recent reform of the 
flexi-jobs scheme have taken place. The number of 
recipients is stable. The scheme seems effective in 
keeping a large number of disabled persons in 
employment, however at a rather high cost to the 
public budget. 
Job-
rotation 
Hiring 
subsidy 
Unem-
ployed 
people 
hired 
as 
substi-
tutes 
for 
em-
3 500 195 DKK 
(26 Euro) 
per hour 
for 
private 
employ-
ers, while 
public 
employ-
Permanent Employer 
must send 
employed 
person on 
training or 
further educa-
tion 
Govern-
ment 
budget. 
DKK 174 
000 000 
The meas-
ure com-
bines a 
hiring 
subsidy 
with train-
ing. 
None Number of 
participants 
monitored by 
the National 
Labour 
Market 
Authority 
There has been no nationwide evaluations of the 
current version of the job-rotation scheme. Howev-
er, the effect can probably be compared with the 
effects of other hiring subsidies, where existing 
evidence suggests positive outcomes in the private 
sector and less positive effects in the public sector. 
This does not take into account the effect of the 
further education that the present employees re-
ceive. An analysis of the effects of the job-rotation 
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ployees 
on 
train-
ing 
ers 
receive 
EUR 23 
(DKK 
173) per 
hour. 
Maxi-
mum 
duration 
is 1 year. 
scheme in the Employment Region of Northern 
Jutland indicated more than three quarters of the 
substitutes found employment immediately after 
finishing their job-rotation cycle (COWI, 2012). 
This is higher than the success rate normally ob-
served after using a hiring subsidy. However, the 
evaluation does not take into account possible 
differences in the characteristics of the participants.  
Adult 
appren-
ticeships 
A hiring 
subsidy for 
companies 
that employ 
an adult 
over 25 
years of age 
in order to 
provide 
them with 
vocational 
education 
Em-
ployed 
and 
unem-
ployed 
aged 
25 
years 
and 
above 
and 
enter-
ing 
voca-
tional 
educa-
tion 
8 000 
persons, 
whereof 
2 500 
were 
previous-
ly unem-
ployed 
DKK 30 
per hour 
for a 
period of 
two 
years.  
Permanent Must pay the 
apprentice 
normal wage 
for unskilled 
workers 
Gov-
ernment 
budget. 
DKK 90 
000 000 
Employer 
must enter 
a training 
agreement 
with the 
apprentice 
None Number of 
participants 
monitored 
by the Na-
tional La-
bour Market 
Authority 
A recent evaluation of the scheme shows that those 
insured unemployed people and social assistance 
recipients who are trained as adult apprentices, 
have a significantly better chance of finding a job 
in the first years after graduation compared to 
unemployed people who have been in normal adult 
education courses (Deloitte, 2013). After one year, 
70 % of participants are in employment, compared 
to 58 % in the comparable control group. The 
effects are particularly significant for former recip-
ients of social assistance. The positive outcomes 
apply to two groups of unemployed people – those 
who already have a vocational education, and those 
who are unskilled. The effects are similar across 
age groups. However, there is a tendency that 
positive employment outcomes are slightly more 
likely for older unemployed people. For those 
participants, who enter the scheme direct from 
employment, the effects are more mixed. There are 
no indications that the scheme leads to a significant 
crowding-out of normal apprenticeships.  
 
 
 
 
